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Nontechnical Summary
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling has provided a number of important
insights about the interplay between environmental tax policy and the pre-existing tax system.
In this paper, we emphasize that a labor market policy of recycling tax revenues from an
environmental tax to lower employers’ non-wage labor cost depends on how the costs of labor
are measured in CGE models. We propose an approach which combines neoclassical
substitutability and fixed factor proportions. This cost-price approach uses Leontief partially
fixed factor proportions to identify both a disposable or variable part and a bound or fixed
portion of each input. The true cost, or cost price, of any input consists of its own price plus
the costs associated with the portion of that input bound to other inputs. As an example, the
cost of an additional worker includes not just salary, but also the costs of inputs tied to the
worker (e.g. office equipment, electricity, material, etc.). Within the cost-price framework, the
demand for an input can be separated into a committed component that is linked to the use of
other inputs and a disposable component which is free for substitution. At one extreme, when
the disposable quantities of all inputs equal zero, no factor substitution is possible and the
cost-price approach reduces to the Leontief fixed-proportion case. At the other extreme, when
the committed quantities of all inputs are zero, the neoclassical model is relevant and the cost-
price of any input equates the market price. We econometrically estimate cost-share equations
in cost prices and then use cost prices instead of market prices to investigate the double
dividend hypothesis. We present both CGE simulation results based on a CO2 tax and the
recycling of its revenues to reduce the non-wage labor cost. One simulation is based on the
market price of labor and the other on the user cost of labor. We found a double dividend
under the first approach but not under the second one. Policy makers have often heard the
economist’s adage that the outcome of a policy is ambiguous and depends on assumptions
made. This fact does not make our consulting work very attractive. However, we think that
our point - that user costs of labor matter more than the normal wage costs - is intuitively
attractive when arguing about the double dividend hypothesis.
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Abstract
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling has provided a number of important
insights about the interplay between environmental tax policy and the pre-existing tax system.
In this paper, we emphasize that a labor market policy of recycling tax revenues from an
environmental tax to lower employers’ non-wage labor cost depends on how the costs of labor
are modeled. We propose an approach which combines neoclassical substitutability and fixed
factor proportions. Our concept implies a user cost of labor which consists of the market price
of labor plus the costs of inputs associated with the employment of a worker. We present
simulation results based on a CO2 tax and the recycling of its revenues to reduce the non-
wage labor cost. One simulation is based on the market price of labor and the other on the
user cost of labor. We found a double dividend under the first approach but not under the
second one.
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11. Introduction
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses have played over the last ten years a key role
in the evaluation of green tax reforms, the reorientation of the tax system to concentrate taxes
more on “bads” like pollution and less on “goods” like labor input or capital formation. The
ongoing concern about the magnitude of distortionary taxation suggests the possibility of
using environmental taxes to replace existing factor and commodity taxes. A conjecture called
the “double dividend hypothesis” points out that environmental taxes have two benefits: they
discourage environmental degradation and they raise revenue that could offset other
distortionary taxes.1 The question in the double dividend debate therefore is whether the
internalization of environmental externalities can be beneficial for other policy areas as well
since the revenues from pollution taxes could be used to cut other distortionary taxes. The
non-environmental dividend can be defined in various ways. Given the important
unemployment problem in the EU, priority has been given to the analysis of distortions in the
labor market that might explain persisting unemployment.2 The revenue from the pollution
taxes are recycled to cut labor taxes. On the one side, the narrow base of an energy tax
constitutes an inherent efficiency handicap. On the other side, the impact of the tax reform on
pre-existing inefficiencies in taxing labor could offset this handicap and a double dividend
arises. Therefore, in principle a double dividend can arise only if (i) the pre-existing tax
system is significantly inefficient on non-environmental grounds and (ii) the revenue-neutral
reform significantly reduces this prior inefficiency. The double dividend actually arises only
if the second condition operates with sufficient force. However, it could also arise if the
burden of the environmental tax falls mainly on the undertaxed factor (e.g. immobile capital)
and relieves the burden of the overtaxed factor labor.3 Since no existing tax systems are likely
in a second-best optimum, the scope for a double dividend is always present.
Although CGE modeling has provided a number of important insights about the
interplay between environmental tax policy and the pre-existing tax system, much remains to
be done to improve our understanding of market-based environmental policy. One reason is
that some CGE modelers affirm the double dividend hypothesis while others could not find a
double dividend outcome. The specification of the labor market, for instance, could be crucial
to the discussion on the effect of environmental policy on employment. A labor market policy
of recycling tax revenues from an environmental tax to lower employers’ non-wage labor cost
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 For a state of the art review on the double dividend issue, see Golder (1997) and Bovenberg and Goulder
(2001).
2
 For theoretical papers on the double dividend issue, see Bovenberg and Goulder (1996); Goulder (1995). See
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1992), Proost and van Regemorter (1995) and Welsch (1996) for empirical papers.
3
 See Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) on this point.
2depends on how the labor market is modeled. Non-competitive labor markets could provide
another potential channel for a double dividend outcome. In most CGE models the labor
market is perfectly competitive and the wage rate adjusts so that supply equals demand.
The objective of this paper is to look at the way, the cost of labor is measured in CGE
models. To this end, we use an approach proposed by Conrad (1983) which combines the
approaches to neoclassical substitutability and fixed factor proportions. This cost-price
approach uses Leontief partially fixed factor proportions to identify both a disposable or
variable part and a bound or fixed portion of each input. The true cost, or cost price, of any
input consists of its own price plus the costs associated with the portion of that input bound to
other inputs. As an example, the cost of an additional worker includes not just salary, but also
the costs of inputs tied to the worker (e.g. office equipment, electricity, material, etc.). Within
the cost-price framework, the demand for an input can be separated into a committed
component linked to the use of other inputs, and a disposable component which is free for
substitution. At one extreme, when the disposable quantities of all inputs equal zero, no factor
substitution is possible and the cost-price approach reduces to the Leontief fixed-proportion
case. At the other extreme, when the committed quantities of all inputs are zero, the
neoclassical model is relevant and the cost-price of any input equates the market price. We
will econometrically estimate cost share equations in cost-prices and then will use cost prices
instead of market prices to investigate the double dividend hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the cost-price approach and
in section 3 the parameter estimates for a restricted version of the manufacturing industry. In
section 4 we briefly outline our CGE model. In section 5 we present our simulation results
based on a CO2 tax and the recycling of its revenues to reduce the non-wage labor cost. One
simulation will be based on market prices and the other one on cost prices. Our objective is to
compare the results in the light of the conjecture of a double dividend. The conclusion from
our result is summarized in section 6.
2. Conditioned input demand and cost share equations in cost-prices
In contrast to Leontief production functions, we assume that only fractions of the input
quantities are related to each other in fixed factor proportions and that therefore, in contrast to
the neoclassical theory, only fractions of the input quantities are disposable for substitutions.
With capital, labor and energy as inputs, we regard a truck, a truck driver and the minimal
possible fuel consumption as bound inputs. In general, however, not the total quantity of an
3input is bound by other inputs with fixed proportions, but a fraction is unbound and
disposable for substitution. It is this fraction which is relevant for a reallocation of inputs if
relative factor prices change. If the energy price increases, the maintenance of the machinery
will be improved (an additional worker), and truck drivers will drive slower (working
overtime or less mileage per day). However, this substitution effect can primarily be observed
with respect to the unbound component of an input; bound factors like machinery, the stock of
trucks, or truck drivers are not objects of a substitution decision; they will be replaced either
simultaneously or not at all as one more unit is linked to high costs due to bound inputs (an
additional truck requires an additional truck driver). In case of a higher energy price,
therefore, the disposable energy input will be the one that will be reduced. The fact that other
inputs are bound to energy should be indicated by a cost-price or user cost in which the price
of energy enters with an appropriate weight. In order to take into account this aspect, we
separate the quantity of an input into a bound part and into an unbound one:4
(1) i i iv v v= +  , 1,...,i n=
where iv  is the number of units of factor i bound by the usage of the remaining 1n −  inputs,
and iv  is the disposable quantity of factor i. The bound quantity of an input, iv , depends with
fixed factor proportions upon the disposable quantities of the other inputs. Here, iv  is a simple
sum, defined as
(2) i ij j
j i
v vα
≠
= ∑  , 0ijα ≥ 1,...,i n=
where ijα  is the quantity of iv  bound to one disposable unit of jv . Substituting (2) into (1)
yields
(3)
1
n
i ij j
j
v vα
=
= ∑  , where 1iiα =
by definition. If the disposable part of input j is increased by one unit, this increases the total
quantity of input j by just this unit and all other inputs i (i = 1,..., n, i ≠ j) by the quantities ijα .
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 For more details see Conrad (1983).
4These ijα  coefficients constitute a matrix ( )ijA α=  which describes the degree of affiliation
for any data set. If ijα  = 0 (i ≠ j)  for all i and j, the neoclassical model is relevant and the cost-
price of any input is its own price. If iv  = 0 (or iv  = iv ) for all i, no factor substitution is
possible and the cost price approach reduces to the Leontief fixed proportion production
function.
We next replace the quantities iv  in the cost minimizing approach by the partitioning
given in (3). Instead of
(4) ( )min ,...,i i i n
i
P v x H v v =  ∑
where x is the given output quantity, we write
1min ,...,i ij j j j nj j
i j j j
P v x H v vα α α
     
=         ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
or
(5) ( )1min ,...,j j n
j
P v x F v v
 
=  ∑

  
where
(6) :j ij i
i
P Pα= ∑          and 1jjα = , 1,...,j n=
is the cost-price of input j. It consists of its own price ( )jP  plus the additional costs associated
with factors bound to jv .
The necessary conditions for a minimum of (5) are
(7)
jj vP Fλ= ⋅  , 1,...,j n= , ( )1,..., nx F v v=  
5where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier. By substituting the cost-minimizing factor demand
functions ( )1; ,...,j j nv f x P P=    into (3) we obtain the cost-minimizing input quantities in terms
of cost prices 1P ,... nP . The dual cost function with respect to the cost prices is then:
( ) ( )1 1; ,..., ; ,...,n j j n
j
C x P P P f x P P= ⋅∑     .
The analogue to Shephard’s lemma (envelope theorem) holds:
(8) ( ); i
i
C x P
v
P
∂
=
∂



(9) ( ); j ij j i
j ji j i
C x P PC
v v
P P P
α
∂   ∂∂
= = ⋅ =    ∂ ∂ ∂  ∑ ∑




.
Equations (8) and (9) provide the disposable amounts of each input as well as the cost
minimizing quantities of total inputs. From Equation (9), we can determine the cost shares
( )iw  of each factor as follows:
(10) ( )ln ;i ii i
i
C x PP v
w P
C P
 ∂
⋅  = =  ∂ 

.
These shares equations can then be used to empirically estimate the parameters of the cost
prices.
In order to introduce technical change into the cost prices, we adopt the specification
proposed by Olson and Shieh (1989):
( )i ij ij j
j
v t vα β= + ⋅∑  .
With this modification Shephard’s lemma holds for both iP  and iP , and it is:
6(8’) ( ); i
i
C x P
v
P
∂
=
∂



(9’) ( ) ( ); i ij ij j i
j ii
C x P
v t v v
P
α β
≠
∂
= + + ⋅ =
∂ ∑

  .
In the next section, we will estimate econometrically the cost-price model.
3. Empirical results for a Cobb-Douglas cost function
As a specification of the cost function we will choose the simplest case, namely a cost
function of the Cobb-Douglas type (henceforth CD). However, an approach with cost prices
and committed inputs does not result in simple measures of the degree of substitutability as in
the conventional CD case where the elasticity of substitution is unity and all inputs are price
substitutes. As shown in Conrad (1983), even under the CD-assumption, variable elasticities
of substitution and complementary relations are possible. Under our assumption of constant
returns to scale and disembodied factor augmenting technical change, jb t⋅ , the CD-cost
function is:
( ) ( )0ln ; ln lnj j j
j
C x P x b t Pα γ= + + + ⋅∑ 
where j
j
γ∑  = 1 and j
j
b∑  = 0. Because of (10),
(11) ( ) ( )j ji i ij ij
j j
b t
w P t
P
γ
α β
  + ⋅ 
= + ⋅      
∑

where ( )j j kj kj k
k j
P P t Pα β
≠
= + + ⋅∑ .
We have nested the inputs of a sector based on an input-output table with 49 sectors, such that
on the first stage the inputs for the CD-production function are capital K, labor L, electricity
E, material M, and fossil fuel F. As data for disaggregated energy inputs are available only for
7a short period of time (1978-90), we are constrained to a pooled time-series cross-section
approach.5 A total of 49 sectors for which data are available in the German national account
statistics are pooled into four sector aggregates:
- the energy supply sectors aggregate
- the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate
- the non-energy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate
- the service sectors aggregate.
The five-equation system, consisting of the five cost-share equations for K, L, E, M, F, is
estimated for each of the four sector aggregates, employing the panel data set in yearly prices
and cost shares. It is assumed that the cost prices are identical in each sector aggregate, i.e.
sectoral dummy variables are added only to the coefficients iγ  in (11).
Due to the high degree of non-linearity inherent in the share equations, we have
simplified our approach by concentrating on the cost-price of labor. Hence, the composition
(3) is reduced to
(12) i KL i iK L Kα= ⋅ +  , i iL L=  , i EL i iE L Eα= ⋅ +  , i ML i iM L Mα= ⋅ +  , i FL i iF L Fα= ⋅ + 
where i = 1,2,3,4 for the four sector aggregates. The cost-prices for K, E, F, M are therefore
market prices, i.e.  i iPK PK= ,  i iPE PE= ,  i iPM PM=  and  i iPF PF= . The cost-price of
labor is:
(13)  i i KL i EL FL i ML iPL PL PK PE PF PMα α α α= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
As mentioned before, iLα , i = K, E, M, F are the same for each sector aggregate and so are the
technical progress parameters ib , i = K, L, E, M, F. We omit technical progress in the cost
prices, i.e. ijβ  = 0 in (11). The system of cost share equations we have to estimate is
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 We are indebted to Henrike Koschel and Martin Falk for providing us with the data set. For more details see
Koschel (2001) and Falk and Koebel (1999).
8(14) ( )

,
iL L ii i
L i
i i
b t PLPL L
w
C PL
γ + ⋅ ⋅
⋅
= =
(15) ( )

,
i
i
KL L L ii i
K i K K
i i
b t PKPK K
w b t
C PL
α γ
γ
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
⋅
= = + ⋅ +
(16) ( )

,
i
i
EL L L ii i
E i E E
i i
b t PEPE E
w b t
C PL
α γ
γ
⋅ + ⋅
⋅
= = + ⋅ +
(17) ( )

,
i
i i
ML L L ii i
M i M M
i i
b t PMPM M
w b t
C PL
α γ
γ
+ ⋅
⋅
= = + ⋅ +
(18) ( )

,
i
i
FL L L ii i
F i F F
i i
b t PFPF F
w b t
C PL
α γ
γ
+ ⋅
⋅
= = + ⋅ +
with  iPL  as given in (13). In addition to using nonlinear techniques, the cost price model
must be estimated with non-negativity constraints imposed on the parameters iLα , i = K, E, M,
F. Table 1 presents the estimated parameters.
Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the cost-prices and of
technical change (asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
Kγ 0.092 (17.173) Kb 8.5·10-4 (0,935) KLα 0.002 (0,431)
Lγ 0.458 (11.340) Lb -0.005 (-1,824) ELα 0.055 (2,611)
Eγ 4·10-8 (6·10-6) Eb 4.2·10-4 (1,889) FLα 0.072 (2,993)
Fγ 0.048 (3.508) Fb -0.002 (-1,143) MLα 0.422 (3,128)
*
Mγ 0.402  –
*
Mb 0.006       –
Log Likelihood = 3540.189
Observations: 637
* As the error terms add to zero, they are stochastically dependent and we have omitted equation (17) for
estimation.
9The bias of technical change is capital, electricity and material using ( Kb >0, Eb >0, Mb >0),
and labor and fossil fuel saving ( Lb <0, Fb <0). The cost price of labor (13) for the industry
with the dummy variable of zero is
(19)  0.002 0.055 0.422 0.072PL PL PK PE PM PF= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ .
Using the iLα  parameter estimates in Table 1, we conclude from (12) that an additional unit of
labor needs 0.002 units of capital, 0.055 units of electricity, 0.422 units of material and 0.072
units of fossil fuel. In other words, reducing labor input by one unit will release 0.002 units of
capital, 0.055 units of electricity, 0.422 units of material and 0.072 units of fossil fuel for
possibilities of substitution as the disposable components K , E , M , F  increase with the
reduction of ( )L L=  . In the next section we will use committed inputs, disposable inputs, and
the corresponding cost-price of labor within the framework of a CGE model to investigate
their impact on the outcome of the double dividend conjecture.
4. The features of the CGE model
This section presents the main characteristics of a comparative-static multi-sector model for
the German economy designed for the medium-run economic analysis of carbon abatement
constraints. The concrete specification of the model covers seven sectors and two factors. The
choice of production sectors captures key dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas
abatement, such as differences in carbon intensities and the scope for substitutability across
energy goods and carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The energy goods identified in the
model are coal (COL), natural gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU), refined oil products (OIL) and
electricity (ELE). Non-energy production consists of an aggregate energy-intensive sector
(EIS) and the rest of production (OTH). Primary factors include labor and capital, which are
both assumed to be intersectorally mobile. Table 2 summarizes the sectors and primary
factors incorporated in the model.
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Table 2: Overview of sectors and factors
Sectors Primary factors
1 COL Coal CAP Capital – K
2 OIL Refined oil products LAB Labor   – L
3 GAS Natural gas
4 ELE Electricity                            – E
5 CRU Crude oil
6 EIS Energy-intensive sectors
7 OTH Rest of industry
The model is a well-known Arrow-Debreu model that concerns the interaction of
consumers and producers in markets. Market demands are the sum of final and intermediate
demands. Final demand for goods and services is derived from the utility maximization of a
representative household subject to a budget constraint. In our comparative-static framework,
overall investment demand is fixed at the reference level. The consumer is endowed with the
supply of the primary factors of production (labor and capital) and tax revenues (including
CO2 taxes). Household preferences are characterized by an aggregate, hierarchical (nested)
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. It is given as a CES composite of an
energy aggregate and a non-energy consumption composite. Substitution patterns within the
energy aggregate and the non-energy consumption bundle are reflected via Cobb-Douglas
functions. Producers choose input and output quantities in order to maximize profits. Figure 1
illustrates the nested structure in production. At the top level, we have the KLEMF-structure
with the CD specification in cost-prices. At the second level, a CES function describes the
substitution possibilities between the material components. The primary energy composite is
defined as a CES function of coal, oil and natural gas. Key substitution elasticities are given
in the Appendix.
The government distributes transfers and provides a public good (including public
investment) which is produced with commodities purchased at market prices. In order to
capture the implications of an environmental tax reform on the efficiency of public fund
raising, the model incorporates the main features of the German tax system: income taxes
including social insurance contributions, capital taxes (corporate and trade taxes), value-added
taxes, and other indirect taxes (e.g. mineral oil tax).
– M
– F
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Figure 1: Nested structure of production
All commodities are traded internationally. We adopt the Armington assumption that
goods produced in different regions are qualitatively distinct for all commodities. There is
imperfect transformability (between exports and domestic sales of domestic output) and
imperfect substitutability (between imports and domestically sold domestic output). On the
output side, two types of differentiated goods are produced as joint products for sale in the
domestic markets and the export markets respectively. The allocation of output between
domestic sales and international sales is characterized by a constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) function. Intermediate and final demands are (nested CES) Armington
composites of domestic and imported varieties. Germany is assumed to be a price-taker with
respect to the rest of the world (ROW), which is not explicitly represented as a region in the
model. Trade with ROW is incorporated via perfectly elastic ROW import-supply and export-
demand functions. There is an imposed balance-of-payment constraint to ensure trade balance
between Germany and the ROW. That is, the value of imports from ROW to Germany must
equal the value of exports to ROW after including a constant benchmark trade surplus
(deficit).
The analysis of the employment effects associated with an environmental tax reform
requires the specification of unemployment. In our formulation, we assume that
unemployment is caused by a rigid and too high consumer wage (see, for example, Bovenberg
and van der Ploeg 1996).
For each input structure of the industries, we choose the KLEMF-model at the top
level. We employ in the cost share equations and in the cost price of labor the parameters,
estimated from another source of input-output tables. Since the cost shares within the six
industries differ from the cost shares calculated in the econometric part, we have to calibrate
EIS OTH CRU
MσFσ
COL OIL GAS
K L E F M
Output
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one parameter per cost share in order to adjust the estimated cost shares to the observed ones
in the 7-industry base year table. Therefore, 
iL
γ  (i = 1,...,7) follows from (14), given the cost
shares of the 7-industry table. If 
iL
γ  is determined, 
iK
γ , 
iE
γ , 
iF
γ  and 
iM
γ  can be calculated
from (15) – (18).
Allen elasticities ( ij) for the Cobb-Douglas function in cost prices in the CGE model
in each sector are given by
( )

21
i j k k ik jk
ij
ki j k
P P b t
w w P
γ α α
σ
 
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= − ⋅  
⋅   
∑ i, j, k = K,L,E,F,M
Allen elasticities are related to the price elasticities of demand for factors of production ( ij)
ij ij jwε σ= ⋅ i, j = K,L,E,F,M
Table 3 presents Allen elasticities and price elasticities of demand in the CGE model with the
parameter estimates of the cost-price model. Capital is a substitute for all inputs with an
elasticity of substitution close to one. Electricity and fossil fuel have a complementary
relationship to labor; material is a substitute for labor, for electricity and for fossil fuel;
electricity and fossil fuel are complements in the non-energy intensive industries (OTH).
The disposable quantities of each factor of production can be derived from equation
(12). The disposable quantity of material, for instance, is

i i ML iM M a L= − ⋅ i = 1,2,...,7
From Table 4 we observe that in the non-energy-intensive industries 82 percent of electricity
is bound to labor whereas in the energy intensive industries (EIS) only 16 percent are bound
to labor; i.e. up to 84 percent are either bound to capital or disposable for substitution. For
materials, 13% of this input in the sector OTH is bound to labor and 87 percent is free for
substitution. In the industry EIS only 6 percent is linked to labor and 94 percent is
substitutable. Similarly as for electricity, a high percentage of fossil fuel (96 percent) is linked
to labor in the industry OTH and only 22 percent in the energy intensive industry EIS. In this
industry, about 80 percent of fossil fuel is a candidate for substitution, whereas in other
industries (OTH) only 4 percent is such a candidate.
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Table 3: Allen elasticities of substitution and price elasticities of demand
Sector OTH EIS OTH EIS
KLσ 0.996 0.993 KLε 0.153 0.097
KEσ 0.997 0.999 KEε 0.011 0.036
KMσ 0.999 0.999 KMε 0.489 0.647
KFσ 0.996 0.998 KFε 0.011 0.032
LEσ -2.181 0.009 LKε 0.333 0.185
LMσ 0.444 0.580 LEε -0.024 0.0003
LFσ -3.035 -0.432 LMε 0.217 0.375
EMσ 0.579 0.937 LFε -0.035 -0.014
EFσ -2.053 0.786 EKε 0.334 0.187
MFσ 0.466 0.909 ELε -0.334 0.001
KKε -0.664 -0.812 EMε 0.283 0.607
LLε -0.491 -0.547 EFε -0.024 0.025
EEε -0.259 -0.820 MKε 0.335 0.187
MMε -0.414 -0.306 MLε 0.068 0.056
FFε -0.073 -0.761 MEε 0.006 0.034
MFε 0.005 0.029
FKε 0.333 0.186
FLε -0.465 -0.042
FEε -0.023 0.028
FMε 0.228 0.589
* The calibrated parameters are 
EISL
γ  = 0.151 and 
OTHL
γ  = 0.238. The benchmark value shares for Germany are
,K EISw  = 0.187, ,L EISw  = 0.097, ,E EISw  = 0.036, ,M EISw  = 0.648, ,F EISw  = 0.032, ,K OTHw  = 0.335, ,L OTHw  =
0.153, 
,E OTHw  = 0.011, ,M OTHw  = 0.489 and ,F OTHw  = 0.011.
Table 4: Disposable and bounded fraction of each factor of production in the CGE model
Disposable Bound (to labor)
OTH EIS OTH EIS
K 0.999 0.999 0.001 0.001
L 1 1 0 0
E 0.185 0.841 0.815 0.159
M 0.868 0.937 0.132 0.063
F 0.040 0.784 0.960 0.216
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Under constant returns to scale and price-taking behavior, the price of an industry j,
jP , is equal to its unit cost:
( ), , , ,j j j j jP c PK PL PE PM PF= .
Written in logarithmic terms, using our CD specification in cost-prices, we obtain
( ) ( )  ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 6 7 1 2 3
ln ln ln ln
ln , , ln , , .
j j j
j j
j K K L L j E E
M M j F F j
P t PK t PL t PE
t PM P P P t PF P P P
γ β γ β γ β
γ β γ β
= + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + ⋅
+ + ⋅ + + ⋅
In addition, we have unit cost functions of the CES type for material and for fossil fuel:
( )5 6 7, ,j jPM f P P P= j = 1,2,...7
( )1 2 3, ,j jPF f P P P= j = 1,2,...7
In order to solve the price system 1 7,...,P P , we have to add the labor-cost price equations (13),
where jPL PL=  for all j. If the price system has been solved, next price dependent input-
output coefficients as derived input demand functions can be determined and the sectoral
output levels can finally be calculated. A detailed description of the model is given in the
Appendix. The main data source underlying the model is the GTAP version 4 database, which
represents global production and trade data for 45 countries and regions, 50 commodities and
5 primary factors (McDougall et al. 1998). In addition, we use OECD/IEA energy statistics
(IEA, 1996) for 1995. Reconciliation of these data sources yields the benchmark data of our
model.
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5. Empirical results
In our simulation, we distinguish two types of scenarios. In each simulation, carbon taxes are
levied in order to meet a 21 percent reduction of domestic carbon dioxide emissions as
compared to 1990 emission levels. This is the reduction target the German government has
committed itself to in the EU Burden Sharing Agreement adopted at the environmental
Council meeting by Member States on June 1998. One type of simulation is based on the
market price of labor and the second type on the cost price of labor. We impose revenue-
neutrality in the sense that the level of public provision is fixed. Subject to this equal-yield
constraint, we consider to ways to recycle the CO2 tax revenue for each type of simulation.
One way is to recycle it by a lump-sum transfer (LS) to the representative household. The
other way is to adopt an environmental tax reform (ETR) in view of the adverse employment
effects of carbon emission constraints. In such a case, the tax revenue is used to lower the
non-wage labor costs (social insurance payment). Table 5 summarizes the implications of the
two types of simulation studies under two ways of recycling the tax revenues. If firms decide
on production and substitution on the base of the market price of labor and the tax revenue is
recycled by a lump-sum transfer, then employment rate will be lower by 0.15 percent (see
column 1 in Table 5). Welfare, expressed here as a change in GDP, will be lower by 0.55
percent. The CO2 tax rate at the 21 percent CO2 reduction level (marginal abatement cost) is
13.9 US$ per ton. Production in all industries declines, proceeded by a lower demand for
labor. If the tax revenue is used to lower non-wage labor costs, we obtain an employment
dividend because employment increases by 0.43 percent. Since GDP does not increase
(–0.38 percent), we do not obtain a “strong double dividend” where the level of emissions is
reduced and employment and GDP are increased from the tax reform by itself. The positive
substitution effect on labor from the ETR outweighs the negative output effect on labor. For
the producer, the price of labor is lower by 0.72 percent compared to the policy of a lump-
sum transfer (last rows in Table 5). The prices PF of fossil fuel have increased by the CO2
tax, and this increase differs by industry according to the size and composition of this input.
The results under the user cost (cost-price) concept of labor can be explained best by
comparing the change of the market price of labor with the change of the user cost of labor
after the ETR. From the producer’s point of view, the price of labor declined by 0.72 percent
after the ETR but only by about 0.59 percent under the user cost concept. As the second half
of Table 5 shows, the cost-price of labor differs by industry because the price aggregates PM
and PF in (19) differ by industry.6 Since direct wage costs are only about two-thirds of the
                                                       
6
 The cost-price approach has not been adopted for the industries coal, crude oil, and gas.
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user cost of labor, the reduction in the cost of labor from the cut in social insurance payments
is smaller under the cost-price concept. Hence, the substitution effect on labor is weaker and
is outweighed by the negative output effect from higher energy prices (lower GDP).
Therefore, we do not obtain a double dividend under the cost-price concept. The higher price
PL  from (19) (about 1.55) is not the reason for this result, because this figure is taken into
account when calibrating the parameters. The crucial impact comes from the aspect that a
higher price of energy also raises the cost-price of labor because workers need energy in order
to be productive. Therefore, employment declines more under the cost-price approach than
under the market price approach (–0.55 versus –0.15 percent). When the tax revenue is
recycled, the firm perceives a reduction of the cost-price by 0.59 percent on the average to
small in order to induce a substitution process high enough to yield a double dividend.
Although the decline in GDP is less under the cost-price approach than under the market price
approach (–0.22 versus –0.38 percent), the incentive for substitution is weaker under the cost
price approach and therefore employment declines (–0.06 versus 0.43 percent).
6. Conclusion
Policy makers are used to an economist’s advice that the outcome of a policy is ambiguous
and depends on assumptions made. This fact makes our consulting work not very attractive.
However, we think that our point that user costs of labor matter more than the normal wage
costs is intuitively attractive when arguing about the double dividend hypothesis.
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Table 5: Empirical results (LS – lump-sum transfer, ETR – environmental tax reform)
 Market price of labor User cost of labor
LS ETR LS ETR
Employment –0.15 0.43 –0.55 –0.06
Consumption –0.47 –0.14 –0.38 –0.02
Carbon tax* 13.92 14.24 14.54 14.92
GDP –0.55 –0.38 –0.43 –0.22
Labor demand
OTH 0.12 0.70 –0.24 0.24
EIS –1.32 –0.72 –1.64 –1.13
COL –25.79 –25.75 –25.71 –25.70
OIL –4.95 –4.39 –5.17 –4.69
GAS –10.42 –9.72 –10.89 –10.29
ELE –0.11 0.51 –1.07 –0.47
Production
OTH –0.11 0.08 –0.02 0.21
EIS –2.07 –1.86 –1.67 –1.40
COL –25.76 –25.96 –25.73 –25.99
OIL –5.19 –4.97 –5.28 –5.02
CRU –2.55 –3.61 –4.08 –5.42
GAS –10.38 –9.90 –10.91 –10.53
ELE –3.53 –3.22 –2.38 –2.02
PL (producer cost) 1 0.9928 1 0.9927
PL (consumer wage) 1 1 1 1
PK 0.9992 0.9977 1.0005 0.9993
PE 1.0355 1.0310 1.0246 1.0199
PF – prices in the corresponding industries
OTH 1.0632 1.0606 1.0650 1.0625
EIS 1.0949 1.0929 1.0982 1.0964
ELE 1.3708 1.3743 1.3869 1.3919
PM – prices in the corresponding industries
OTH 1.0031 0.9997 1.0022 0.9986
EIS 1.0057 1.0023 1.0045 1.0009
OIL 1.0032 0.9999 1.0023 0.9988
Cost prices – PL  in the corresponding industries
OTH 1.5582 1.5490
EIS 1.5616 1.5524
COL 1 0.9927
OIL 1.4251 1.4164
CRU 1 0.9927
GAS 1 0.9927
ELE 1.1016 1.0947
% change of PL  in the corresponding industries
OTH –0.5936
EIS –0.5898
COL –0.7275
OIL –0.6147
CRU –0.7275
GAS –0.7275
ELE –0.6291
* In US$. All other figures are percentage values or price indices.
1 0.9928
–0.7240
18
References
Bovenberg, A.L. and L.H. Goulder, Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other
Taxes: General Equilibrium Analysis, American Economic Review, 86, 4, 985-1000,1996.
Bovenberg, A.L. and L.H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and Regulation in a Second-Best
Setting, in: Handbook of Public Economics, 2. ed., A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.),
North Holland, 2001.
Bovenberg, A.L. and F. van der Ploeg, Optimal Taxation, Public Goods and Environmental
Policy with Involuntary Unemployment, Journal of Public Economics, 62, 59-83, 1996.
Conrad, K., Cost Prices and Partially Fixed Factor Proportions in Energy Substitution,
European Economic Review, 21, 299-312, 1983.
Conrad, K., Computable General Equilibrium Models for Environmental Economics and
Policy Analysis, in: J. van den Bergh (ed.), The Handbook of Environmental and Resource
Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing Comp., 1999.
Falk, M. and B.M. Koebel, Curvature Conditions and Substitution Pattern among Capital,
Energy, Material and Heterogeneous Labor, Discussion Paper No. 99-06, ZEW,
Mannheim, 1999.
Ferris, M.C. and T.S. Munson, Complementarity Problems in GAMS and the PATH Solver,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24 (2), 165-188, 2000.
Goulder, L.H., Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An
Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis, Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 29, 271-297, 1995.
Goulder, L.H., Environmental Taxation in a Second-Best World, in H. Folmer and T.
Tietenberg (eds.), The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics,
Edward Elgar, Chaltenham, 1997.
IEA (International Energy Agency), Energy Prices and Taxes, Energy Balances of OECD and
Non-OECD-countries; IEA publications: Paris, 1996.
Jorgenson, D.W. and P.J. Wilcoxen, Reducing U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions: The Cost of
Different Goals, in: J.R. Moroney (ed.), Energy, Growth, and Environment: Advances in the
Economics of Energy and Resources, 7, JAI Press, 125-158, 1992.
Koschel, H., A CGE-Analysis of the Employment Double Dividend Hypothesis, Diss.
University of Heidelberg, 2001.
McDougall R.A., Elbehri A. and T.P. Truong, Global trade, Assistance and Protection: The
GTAP 4 Data Base; Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University: West Lafayette,
1998.
19
Olson, D.O. and Y.-N. Shieh, Estimating Functional Forms in Cost-Prices, European
Economic Review, 33, 1445-1461, 1989.
Proost, S. and D. van Regemorter, The Double Dividend and the Role of Inequality Aversion
and Macroeconomic Regimes, International Tax and Public Finance, 2,  207-219, 1995.
Welsch, H., Recycling of Carbon/Energy Taxes and the Labor Market - A General Equilibrium
Analysis for the European Community, Environmental and Resource Economics, 8, 141-155,
1996.
Yen, S.T., Estimating Functional Forms in Cost-Prices – A Comment, European Economic
Review, 37, 203-208, 1993.
20
Appendix
The appendix provides an algebraic summary of the comparative-static model. It is
formulated as a mixed-complementarity problem (MCP) using the General Algebraic
Modeling System (GAMS) (Ferris and Munson 2000). In this approach, four classes of
equilibrium conditions characterize an economic equilibrium: zero-profit conditions for
constant-returns-to-scale production activities, market clearance conditions for each primary
factor and produced good, income definitions for the economic agents, and auxiliary equations
(equal yield constraints). The fundamental unknowns of the system are activity levels, market
prices, income levels and auxiliary variables. The zero profit conditions exhibit complementary
slackness with respect to associated activity levels, the market clearance conditions with respect
to market prices, the income definition equations with respect to the incomes of the economic
agents, and the auxiliary equations with respect to the auxiliary variables. The orthogonality
symbol, ⊥ , associates the variables for the complementary slackness conditions.
Differentiating profit and expenditure functions with respect to input and output prices
provides compensated demand and supply coefficients (Hotelling’s lemma), which appear
subsequently in the market clearance conditions. An equilibrium allocation determines
production levels, prices, incomes and auxiliary variables. Table A1 explains the notations for
variables and parameters. Table A2 gives key substitution elasticities.
Zero profit conditions
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Input and output coefficients
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Market clearance conditions
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Income definitions
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Auxiliary equation
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Table A1: Sets, activity and price variables, endowments
Sets
i, j Sectors and goods (7 commodities)
Activity variables
Yi Aggregate production
Ai Armington aggregate
C Aggregate household consumption
Z Aggregate government consumption
U Unemployment
Price variables
Pi Output price
PAi Price of Armington aggregate
PE Price of electricity ( )ELEPA=
PMi Price of material aggregate
PFi Price of fossil fuel aggregate
PI Composite price for investment
PFX ROW export and import price
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Table A1: continued
PC Composite price for aggregate household demand (utility price index)
PZ Composite price for government demand
PK Price of capital services
PL (Rigid) wage rate
PCO Price of carbon emission rights (carbon tax)
Income variables
RAM Income of representative agent
GM Government income
Auxiliary variables
,LS ETRτ τ Endogenous equal yield tax adjustment
Endowments
K Aggregate capital endowment
L Aggregate labor endowment
CO Endowment with carbon emission rights
Input and output coefficients (per unit demand and supply)
aKi Capital demand
a Li Labor demand
aYji Intermediate demand for Armington good
aCj Private demand for Armington good
a Zj Government demand for Armington good
a Ij Investment demand for Armington good
aHi Demand for domestic production
aMi Demand for imports
aDi Supply to domestic market
a Xi Supply to export market
aCOi Carbon coefficient
Other parameters
Z Exogenously-specified (fixed) demand for public output
I (Fixed) aggregate investment level
D Balance of payment surplus
TR Lump sum transfers
t Income tax
KLα , ELα , MLα , FLα Cost price coefficients
iK
γ ,
iL
γ ,
iE
γ ,
iM
γ ,
iF
γ Calibrated cost price parameters
b, c, d, e, f, g, h Technology coefficients
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Table 2A:  Key substitution elasticities
Description Value
Substitution elasticities in production
Mσ Material vs. material 0.5
Fσ Fossil fuel vs. fossil fuel 0.3
Substitution elasticities in private demand
Cσ Energy goods vs. non-energy goods 0.8
Non-energy good vs. non-energy good 1
Energy good vs. energy good 1
Substitution elasticities in government demand
Gσ Fossil fuel vs. fossil fuel 0.8
Fossil fuels vs. non-fossil fuels 1
Non-fossil fuel vs. non-fossil fuel 1
Elasticities in international trade (Armington)
Aσ Substitution elasticity between imports vs. domestic inputs 4.0
Transformation elasticity domestic vs. export 4.0
